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TRANSPORTATION STRIKES: A PROPOSAL FOR
CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION
A. SYDNEY HERLONG, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
S INCE 18861 Congress has been troubled intermittently with the
problems encountered in dealing with emergency labor disputes. The
passage of time, which often finds the resolution of such difficulties, has
neither resolved nor lessened the impact of these conflicts; on the con-
trary, the situation has gradually become more and more serious. In the
rail and air transportation industries, which today more than ever are
critical elements in our economy, this problem, instead of diminishing has
reached an acute stage. This is an area where the public interest requires
a forward-looking solution.
I. THE NEED FOR A RE1MEDY
It has been almost universally recognized that corrective action should
be taken. However, little effective progress has been made. The President,
in his State of the Union Message in 1966, indicated that he would
recommend appropriate legislation to deal with such situations; 2 however,
no suggestions have been forthcoming. The President has appointed a
task force, headed by Undersecretary of State Katzenbach to investigate
the problem and submit a report. However, this group has not yet made
public any report. Similarly, resolutions have been introduced in Congress
which would require the Secretary of Labor to submit a proposal for
dealing with national emergency strikes.' These too have given rise
to little encouragement.
Despite all the articles which have been written by men prominent in
this area,4 all the studies which have been conducted by the various
Committees of Congress and all the action which has been taken by
Congress, to date,5 nothing in terms of a continuing solution has been
accomplished.
* United States Representative from the Fourth District of Florida; member of the
Florida Bar.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 7479, 49th Cong., Ist Sess. (1886).
2. 1966 State of the Union Address, January 12, 1966, Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents, January 17, 1966 at 30.
3. S.j. Res. 9, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S.J. Res. 195, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
4. E.g., K. Braun, Labor Disputes and Their Settlement (1955); H. Kaltenborn, Gov-
ernmental Adjustment of Labor Disputes (1943); L. Lecht, Experience Under Railway
Labor Legislation (1955); C. Updegraff & W. McCoy, Arbitration of Labor Disputes (1946).
5. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 701, H.R. 704, H.R. 706 Before Subcomm. on Transportation
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Although a number of solutions have been suggested, it will be the
purpose of this article to review only the principal measures presently
pending in Congress. The relative merits of these pieces of proposed
legislation will be viewed in light of H.R. 8320, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
which represents the position of the author. The frame of reference of this
article will be limited to railroad and airline disputes so that the much-
debated question of what constitutes a genuine "emergency" dispute will
thereby be narrowed. That a strike affecting vital rail transportation facil-
ities does indeed constitute a crisis requiring congressional intervention
is attested to by the enactment in 1963 of Public Law 88-1081 to avoid
the strike then threatened by the railroad operating brotherhoods in the
National Work Rules Case,7 and the recent enactment on July 17, 1967
of Public Law 90-54 to stop the strike of railroad shop workers then in
progress. The President, in his message on the threatened railroad strike,
stated succinctly the reason why this nation cannot tolerate a nationwide
rail strike.
The purpose of this message and of this proposal is to impress upon the parties
and to make clear to the Nation what is at stake here.
The cost of a nationwide railroad strike would be incalculable. I urge you to
consider these facts:
On the first morning of the strike three-quarters of a million rail commuters in
New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia alone would be unable to take their trains
to work.
Shipments of perishable foodstuffs to many major cities would be halted at once.
Actual food shortages could soon occur in several cities.
Some health hazards would develop. For example, supplies of chlorine used to
purify community water supplies would grow short.
The coal-mining industry, with 140,000 workers, would cease operations almost
at once.
Many other industries which rely heavily on the railroads-such as metal mining,
steel, chemicals-would be badly crippled and soon begin to close down.
For a week or more most factories could operate from their inventories. Soon,
shortages and bottlenecks would begin to curtail production drastically. A spreading
epidemic of lost production and lost jobs would sweep through the Nation.
In short, a railroad strike would affect every man, woman, and child in this Nation.
It would increase the cost of living. Each day the strike continued would bring
pyramiding losses in goods, services, and income-losses which can never be fully
and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965).
6. 77 Stat. 132 (1963).
7. For an historical account of the case see Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Akron &
B.B.R.R., - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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regained. A prolonged strike could well break the back of the Nation's stable pros-
perity for some period to come. 8
Although a nationwide airline strike would not, at the present time, be
as disastrous as a nationwide railroad strike, and although the nation did
survive the airline strike of 1966, it is clear that some means should be
devised to avoid the enormous burdens imposed on the public by such
a strike.
II. PROPOSED REMEDIES
The remedies which have been suggested, while varying in detail,
generally fall into one of three categories: seizure, arsenal of weapons or
governmental adjudication (usually referred to, at least by those who
oppose it, as compulsory arbitration).
A. Seizure
Various proposals for seizure-type legislation have been advocated for
many years. One such proposal was introduced in its present form on
April 6, 1967 as S. 1456. This measure would empower the President to
direct the Attorney General to petition a federal district court for ap-
pointment of a receiver to take possession of essential facilities which are
struck or threatened with a strike and to operate them "in the interests
of the United States." An essential element of compulsion would be in-
volved in authorizing such receiver to put into effect, for the duration
of his retention of control of a facility, any rates of pay, rules or working
conditions recommended by a board of inquiry or an emergency board."0
The receivership would last until the dispute was resolved, when the
property would be returned to its rightful owners." While a facility would
be operated "for the account of" its owners, operations would be per-
mitted only to the extent required by the necessities.' 2 If an owner were
unhappy with the financial arrangements, a petition for payment of "just,
fair, and reasonable compensation" could be filed with the President."
Not only would the President then resolve the compensation question, but
in making his decision, he would be directed to consider the value of
the seized facility as though it were shut down or threatened with a
shutdown by labor difficulties.14 An owner dissatisfied with the Presi-
8. 113 Cong. Rec. S4771 (daily ed. April 10, 1967).
9. S. 1456, 90th Cong., 1st Ses., at 3 (1967).
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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dent's decision could file suit against the United States in the Court of
Claims or any district court.1"
It is felt by many that seizure is not a remedy at all. Being more in
the nature of a punishment, by itself it solves or settles nothing. Only
when coupled with some form of governmental prescription of rates of
pay, rules or working conditions does it move in the direction of settle-
ment, and the more it moves in that direction the less value can be ascribed
to the "remedy" of seizure standing alone.
B. Arsenal of Weapons
Perhaps the most popular approach, at least in academic circles, is
that which would vest in the President an "arsenal of weapons" among
which he could pick and choose, depending on the situation confronting
him at any given time. Professor Archibald Cox"0 is credited with being
the architect of this type of plan. 7 It would put at the President's disposal
fact-finding boards to serve as mediators and to make recommendations,
boards of inquiry to urge voluntary arbitration, means of "blaming"
publicly those deemed at fault, temporary injunctions, "limited" seizures
and, finally, the authority to do nothing.' The theory of this remedy is
that if the parties are kept off balance through uncertainty as to what the
President might or might not do, they will be compelled in their own
interests to reach some form of agreement to avoid or stop a strike.
A thoughtful form of the "arsenal of weapons" approach is reflected in
the present Congress by H.R. 5683, introduced on February 16, 1967.
Unlike most forms which this remedy usually takes, however, this par-
ticular "arsenal" bill includes governmental adjudication as one of its
"weapons."
The bill is a step in the right direction, but it shares the infirmities of
all forms of the "arsenal of weapons" approach. In the first place, the
theory that uncertainty as to what course may be followed will result in
new pressures on the parties to reach agreement overlooks the fact that
this same element of uncertainty will extend to the public. But the public
demands, and is entitled to, not uncertainty but assurances that there
will be no interruption of vital rail and air transportation services by
strikes. Secondly, vesting in the President authority to exercise one or
another of several possible courses of action necessarily imposes on him
15. Id. at 7.
16. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, formerly Solicitor General of the United
States.
17. Cox, The Uses and Abuses of Union Power, 35 Notre Dame Law. 624 (1960).
18. Id. at 635.
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a duty to select which course will be taken. This would inevitably expose
him to enormous and conflicting economic and political pressures when-
ever the necessity arose for exercising his judgment in this respect. He
should be protected from these as much as possible. In connection with
rail and airline labor disputes Congress can and should insulate him by
prescribing itself precisely what course is to be followed. Finally, the
available evidence indicates that, with one exception, there is no reason to
expect the "arsenal of weapons" remedy, as embodied in H.R. 5683 or in
any other form yet recommended, to be any more effective than what we
already have in the Railway Labor Act.1 The Act today includes negotia-
tion,2 mediation,21 proffer to voluntary arbitration,22 emergency board
investigations,' reports24 and recommendations2 and, presumably through
publication of the latter, public "blame" for the stubborn party. These
constitute a formidable arsenal and, as shall shortly be pointed out in
more detail, are effective in all but a few cases.
This leaves the exceptional case as the heart of the problem, and the
prospects of resolving that case would not be enhanced by a slight altera-
tion in the form of the "arsenal of weapons" unless governmental adjudi-
cation were added, as is proposed in H.R. 5683. Thus, the only part of the
proposal that would help would be governmental adjudication, leaving
the rest as nothing more than a reshuffling or rearrangement of what we
already have. It is the opinion of this author that governmental adjudi-
cation is what is needed; we should go right to it and leave the rest of the
Act substantially intact.
Another important pending bill is S. 176, introduced on January 11,
1967. It is more in the nature of an "arsenal of weapons" plan than
anything else, although, for reasons which will shortly be obvious, it is
also in part a governmental adjudication measure. This measure would
apply to all industries engaged in interstate commerce,- not just those
subject to the Railway Labor Act. It is intended to reach all labor disputes
which result in, or threaten to result in, strikes which "will adversely
affect the public interest of the Nation to a substantial degree."' As the
ultimate means of resolving such disputes, it would create a "United
19. 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
24. Id.
25. 44 Stat. 584 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 158(k) (1964).
26. S. 176, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1967).
27. Id. at 5.
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States Court of Labor-Management Relations"" consisting of five judges
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.'
The mechanics of getting the merits of a dispute before the court
would be somewhat involved. First, if the President believed that a
threatened or actual strike "affecting an entire industry or a substantial
part thereof" would, if not stopped, "adversely affect the public interest
of the Nation to a substantial degree," he would be authorized, but not
required, to appoint a "board of inquiry" to "inquire into the issues in-
volved in the dispute and ... make a written report ... within such time
as he shall prescribe."30 The report of the board, which apparently could
be rendered with or without public or private hearings, would include a
statement of the facts, together with each party's statement of its posi-
tion,3 but would not include any recommendations. It would be filed with
the United States Conciliation Service and would also be made public. 2
Having received such report, and if he believed that the strike or
threatened strike would "adversely affect the public interest of the Nation
to a substantial degree," then the President would have the option of
directing the Attorney General to petition the Court of Labor-Manage-
ment Relations to have the strike enjoined.33 Indeed, that is the only
way in which the jurisdiction of the court could be invoked-by the
Attorney General when directed to do so by the President. The court
would then be required to second-guess the President. It could issue
injunctive relief only if it first found that the strike involved all or a
substantial part of an industry3" and, if not stopped, would "adversely
affect the public interest of the Nation to a substantial degree."" For
the first eighty days after a strike was enjoined, the court would assist
the parties in further conciliatory and mediatory efforts to reach a volun-
tary settlement. 36 If those proved unavailing, the court would continue the
injunction in force on its own motion and "set the matter down for im-
mediate hearings and final determination . . . on the merits of the
dispute ....
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 11-12.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id.
33. Id. at S.
34. Id. at 5-6.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. Id. at 7.
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The jurisdiction of the court would extend both to grievance-type
cases and to disputes over changes in rates of pay, hours and conditions
of work.3" Its decisions would be final and binding on the parties."9 Rates
of pay and conditions of employment established by it would have to be
"fair and equitable" and rates of pay "must be within the employer's
ability to pay.""0 It is further provided that "[i] n all cases, the court must
consider, as a primary factor, the national and public interest involved in
a fair and just settlement which will promote, to the greatest extent
possible, fair, equitable, and workable industrial relations between the
parties in the future."'" A limited form of direct judicial review by the
United States Supreme Court is prescribed.' The grounds for review
are that decisions of the court "are arbitrary and capricious or are
violative of a right conferred by the Constitution of the United States."'1
3
There are a number of objections to the plan embodied in this bill. In
the first place, no need has been demonstrated for extending such legisla-
tion to all industries engaged in interstate commerce. Experience to date
limits the justification for Congress to intrude further in the labor rela-
tions field at this time to the railroad and airline industries. The sug-
gestion that there be a permanent labor court involves serious problems.
There would be continuing pressures on the President, especially from
organized labor, to appoint partisans. Since it would not be a tripartite
court-and hardly could be in view of the variety and complexity of
problems which might reach it from our diverse industrial enterprises-
there would be serious risks of practical errors. Tripartite boards, with
experienced representatives of management and labor, are essential to
insure practical and realistic decisions. Certainly no justification has been
shown for a permanent court. Not only would such a body tend to per-
petuate its own errors, but it very likely would not have enough to do
except possibly in the grievance field. To establish a court to deal mostly
with grievances would be tantamount to Congress establishing a Federal
Small Claims Court.
The Senate bill, like H.R. 5683, would continue the element of un-
certainty inherent in all "arsenal of weapons" plans, although, as men-
tioned above, the public interest demands certainty that there will be no
interruptions in vital transportation services because of strikes. Finally,
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id. at 10-11.
40. Id. at 9.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 10-11.
43. Id. at 10.
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as H.R. 5683, the Senate bill would expose the President to unwarranted
political and economic pressures.
C. Governmental Adjudication - H.R. 8320
To resolve the problem, the author introduced H.R. 8320.14 This bill
has been designed to accord the necessary certainty required by the
shipping and traveling public, to protect the President from the economic
and political pressures inherent in any "arsenal of weapons" and to
utilize the advantages of ad hoc tripartite boards. The bill takes the form
of an amendment to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, leaving the
rest of the Act untouched. Experience has indicated that the provisions
of the Act for negotiation, mediation and proffer of arbitration have
worked a good deal better than critics of the Act would have us believe."'
It is when these fail to produce agreement that crises result; and, while
the number of crises in relative numbers may be comparatively small,
they are of critical consequence because the public cannot afford any.
In its present form, Section 10 provides for the now familiar Emergency
Boards.46 It states that in the event of a threatened strike, which in the
judgment of the National Mediation Board would "interrupt interstate
commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of
essential transportation service," the Board "shall notify the President,
who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board to investigate and
report .... ,4' A report is required within thirty days of the appointment
of a board,48 and strikes are forbidden from the time a board is named
until thirty days after it has rendered its report.40 While not in terms
required or directed in Section 10, these Emergency Boards customarily
have returned specific recommendations for settlement of disputes re-
ferred to them.5"
Congress did not intend that Emergency Board reports be treated by
the parties as advisory only. While Congress did not explicitly so provide,
such reports were meant to be final and conclusive, and the force of public
opinion was relied on to make them binding on the parties."' It has not
44. H.R. 8320, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
45. See Administration of the Railway Labor Act by the National Mediation Board
1934-1957, at 44-45 (1958).
46. 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Administration of the Railway Labor Act by the National Mediation Board 1934-
1957 at 44 (1958).
51. L. Lecht, Experience Under Railway Labor Legislation 53 (1955).
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worked out as planned, however. While they have proven to be conclusive
on the railroads, Emergency Board Reports have come to serve only as
floors for further bargaining insofar as railroad unions are concerned."
This has resulted in one-sided governmental adjudication in disputes
under Section 10 of the Act.
H.R. 8320 would carry out the original intention of Congress when it
enacted that section and would remedy the manifest inequity in the
present section by specifically requiring governmental adjudication
binding on all parties to railroad and airline labor disputes which
threaten interruptions of continued transportation service. Existing pro-
visions of the Act for handling "major" disputes over changes in agree-
ments respecting rates of pay, rules and working conditions would be
retained, and the mandatory requirements of good faith bargaining in
direct negotiations, mediation and proffer of voluntary arbitration would
be preserved.- Section 10 alone would be revised, and it would, as now,
become applicable only when the preceding processes of the Act fail to
produce agreement-that is, when the procedures for voluntary collec-
tive bargaining are exhausted without settlement.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that there is no purpose or intent
to supplant collective bargaining as the preferred process for resolving
labor disputes. The importance of the bargaining process would, on the
contrary, be given even greater emphasis. Governmental adjudication
would be provided only as a last-ditch means of avoiding a ruinous strike
and would be utilized only when bargaining has failed completely.
Section 10, First(a), of H.R. 8320 would empower either party to a
"major" dispute which threatens to erupt into a work stoppage to request
the Mediation Board to notify the President of the situation." The
Board must give such notice on request," and the President is required
on receipt of notice to create a "Presidential Board" to "investigate and
decide such dispute."56 A separate Presidential Board would be created
for each dispute5" and would be tripartite in composition, with not less than
five members. A majority of a Presidential Board would represent the pub-
lic, with the remaining members divided equally between representatives
of the parties. Section 10, First(b), of the bill directs that a Presidential
Board shall promptly hold public hearings and report in writing its find-
52. Id. at 6.
53. 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964).
54. H.R. 8320, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1967).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3.
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ings, conclusions and decisions on each issue involved within sixty days
after appointment. 8 The President is authorized to extend the period
within which a Board must report.59 In proposed Section 10, Third, it is
provided that rates of pay, rules and working conditions prescribed by a
Board shall be "just and reasonable" and shall continue in effect until
changed in accordance with the procedures of the Act, unless set aside in
judicial proceedings thereafter provided for or changed by voluntary
agreement of the parties."0 In order to meet the problem of disputes over
the meaning of any part of its decision, Section 10, Fifth, states that on
application of a party a Presidential Board shall reconvene and, with or
without further hearing, issue a clarification reportY1 Section 10, Sixth,
would make decisions of Presidential Boards "conclusive and bind-
ing on the parties and enforceable by appropriate proceedings" in the
federal district courts.2 A very limited form of judicial review is provided
by Section 10, Seventh.6 A new Section 10A, proscribing specific types of
strikes and lockouts, would be added to the Railway Labor Act by H.R.
8320, with civil and criminal sanctions provided for violations."' An un-
lawful strike or lockout would specifically be subject not only to injunc-
tive relief but to suits for damages as well."
Before responding to the standard objections to a bill such as this, it
should be pointed out again that the real question is not whether, but
what kind of a remedy is needed. All would prefer collective bargaining
to work or crises to disappear. But collective bargaining does not always
work and crises do arise, as recent experience so clearly teaches. As
already stated, the "arsenal of weapons" approach is not satisfactory for
at least two reasons-it does not accord the public the assurance of pro-
tection needed against railroad and airline strikes and it exposes the
President to undesirable economic and political pressures in times of
crisis. And as between the two remaining alternatives, seizure and gov-
ernmental adjudication, governmental adjudication, in this author's
opinion, is the only palatable answer.
1. Constitutional Considerations
One no longer hears very loud claims that a statute such as that pro-
posed by H.R. 8320 would contravene the Constitution of the United
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 5-6.
63. Id. at 6-7.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 10.
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States. For the benefit of those who might raise the question, the per-
tinent cases can be briefly reviewed. In 1916, Congress averted a railroad
strike by enacting the Adamson Act settling the industry's eight-hour
day controversy.66 That act was sustained in the face of a constitutional
attack in Wilson v. New.67 In 1963, P.L. 88-10861 was passed at the
eleventh hour to avoid an imminent strike by railroad operating employees
in the dispute over elimination of firemen from diesel locomotives and
other proposed changes in the composition of train crews. This statute
directed that the controversy be resolved by final and binding arbitra-
tion.' The constitutionality of that statute was affirmed in Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R.7 ' As a matter of fact, in that litigation counsel for the unions ad-
mitted in argument7 1 that Congress does have constitutional authority to
enact a law such as P.L. 88-108, requiring governmental adjudication of a
labor dispute. 2
2. Impact on Collective Bargaining
The objection to governmental adjudication most frequently heard is
that it would "destroy collective bargaining."73 This has been repeated so
often that a substantial number of otherwise responsible people accept it
as gospel. In truth, it is a myth contradicted both by experience and by the
considered judgment of the best-informed persons in the railroad labor
field. 4 The theory is that if the parties know a board exists to write an
agreement or reach a settlement for them they--one or the other, or both
of them-will not be disposed to engage in genuine bargaining, preferring
to leave the matter to a board. In the abstract, this makes little sense.
Human nature being what it is, the parties would always prefer to make
their own settlement if humanly possible. If they know that there is a
board to make an agreement for them when they are unable to resolve
their differences themselves, the availability of such a board would put
even greater pressure on them than there would be in its absence.
Consider, for example, the experience of our courts which exist to
66. 39 Stat. 721, 722 (1916).
67. 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
68. 77 Stat. 132 (1963).
69. Id.
70. 225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 918 (1964).
71. 225 F. Supp. at 22.
72. Id.
73. See J. Kaufman, Collective Bargaining in the Railroad Industry, 164 (1954); H.
Northrup, Compulsory Arbitration and Government Intervention in Labor Disputes, 51
(1966).
74. See generally H. Roberts, Compulsory Arbitration: Panacea or Millstone? 87 (1965).
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render final and binding decisions on questions put to them by litigants.
It is a matter of common knowledge that only a very small percentage of
cases filed in court are tried to judgment; most are settled out of court.78
If the theory of the objection, that the availability of governmental ad-
judication would destroy collective bargaining in railroad and airline
labor disputes by removing the incentive to bargain, were sound, most
court cases would be tried rather than settled. The reason they are not
is that the parties prefer the relative certainty of their own settlements
to the uncertainty of carrying their cases to a conclusion. A similar
practice would be followed in labor disputes under similar circumstances.
The validity of this analogy is attested to by the experience of the rail-
roads both in "minor" and "major" disputes. For more than thirty years
we have had a system of governmental adjudication of "minor" disputes
of the grievance type over the interpretation or application of existing
collective agreements. The National Railroad Adjustment Board sits to
settle such disputes which the unions and the railroads are unable to
resolve themselves. While the dockets of certain of its four divisions
have been overcrowded,"6 it is nonetheless a fact that most grievances are
resolved through conference negotiation and never reach the Adjustment
Board. Therefore, its availability does not appear to have acted to deter
the bargaining process.
Experience in the "major" dispute field has been similar. For many
years prior to the Award of Arbitration Board No. 282, appointed pur-
suant to Public Law 88-108 in 1963, the railroads had sought to reduce
the size of train and yard crews through the collective bargaining pro-
cess.77 They had been unable to secure any meaningful adjustments.
Then, Board 282 provided in its award a series of guidelines for making
reductions in the size of those crews. These guidelines were to be used,
first, in local negotiations by the parties in attempts to reach agreement
and, in the event of failure of such negotiations, by special arbitration
boards." The results were illuminating. Once the unions were confronted
with the fact of a terminal procedure, their former attitude of uncom-
promising resistance changed to a more realistic one of accepting, al-
though reluctantly, the facts of change. During the two years the award
was in effect a substantial number of reductions were made in firemen's
75. For a discussion of this trend see Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and
the Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1961); 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1314 (1959).
76. Lecht, supra note 51, at S.
77. Thirtieth Ann. Rep. of the Nat'l Mediation Bd. for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1964,
at 2.
78. Id. at 15.
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positions and also in positions of road, train and yard service crews by
the application of the procedures outlined in the award 0 -a sharp con-
trast with the preceding 62 years which had produced virtually no agree-
ments even though every public body which had investigated the matter
had found the railroads encumbered by too many employees.
3. Impact on the "Right" to Strike
Related to the complaint that governmental adjudication of railroad and
airline labor disputes, when all else is unavailing, would destroy collec-
tive bargaining is the charge, almost equally popular, that it would deny
employees their right to strike. This charge, however, exaggerates the
status of the "right" to strike. While there may be such a "right" in an
abstract sense, it is not a constitutional right.80 It has been subject to
limitation in various circumstances in which the interests of the public
have been found to outweigh the selfish interests of employees. Familiar
examples are laws forbidding strikes by public employees, including the
one enacted by Congress in 1947 which determined that the public inter-
est in uninterrupted continuation of government services required that
strikes by federal employees be prohibited."' In 1916, Congress passed a
special law authorizing the President, in time of war, to seize transporta-
tion companies when necessary to insure their continued operation."
That law was utilized on several occasions by Presidents Roosevelt and
Truman to keep the railroads from being strike-bound.'
Public Laws 88-108 in 196384 and 90-54 in 1967,"5 enacted specifically
to stop railroad strikes in "major" disputes, in addition to the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act, which have been construed and are regularly
applied to prohibit strikes in "minor" disputes,8 not only illustrate
further restrictions which Congress has placed on the "right" to strike
79. Thirty-second Ann. Rep. of the Nat'l Mediation Bd. for Fiscal Year Ending June
30, 1966, at 13.
80. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926); cf. NLRB v. Eric Registor Corp., 373
US. 221, 233-34 (1963); Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Steel Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536-37 (1949).
81. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 305, 61 Stat. 160 (1947), as amended, 18 US.C. § 1918
(1966).
82. Army Appropriation Act of 1916, 10 U.S.C. §§ 4742, 9743 (1964), formerly 39 Stat.
619, 645 (1916).
83. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 621-27 (1952) (concur-
ring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, app. II).
84. 77 Stat. 132 (1963).
85. 81 Stat. 122 (1967).
86. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Louisville & H.R.R., 373 U.S. 33 (1963);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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but raise the question whether, in the usual sense, such "right" is part of
the larger right of railroad employees to organize and bargain collec-
tively. The answer to that question seems plainly to be in the negative-
railroad employees are not free to strike in the same manner as em-
ployees in other industries because their "right" to engage in economic
warfare is outweighed by the public interest in the continuation of trans-
portation service.
There is no inequity in this; railroads are common carriers and as
such have a duty to provide transportation service. This restricts, if,
indeed, it does not deny, any freedom in the railroads to "lock out" their
employees. In other industries that freedom or right is regarded as
management's "weapon" to offset labor's right to strike. If railroads do
not have an unlimited right to lock out, why should their employees have
an unlimited right to strike? When one applies for and is given employ-
ment by a railroad, he should be taken to have assumed a part of the rail-
road's obligations as a common carrier and to have forfeited any claim
to an unrestricted right to strike.
4. Impact on Other Industries
In the past, spokesmen for industries outside the transportation field
have generally opposed governmental adjudication of any labor disputes . 7
Their attitude has been reflected in the views of a number of members of
Congress.88 This hostility is a product of the fear that governmental
adjudication, once adopted on a permanent basis for the railroads and air-
lines, would then spread to other industries. There is evidence, however,
that this opposition is abating as it becomes increasingly apparent that
the railroads and airlines are sufficiently unique that any arrangement
adopted for resolving their particular labor disputes would not constitute
a persuasive authority for extension of a similar arrangement to other
industries.89 It should be remembered that there has been in effect for
many years under the Railway Labor Act a plan for governmental ad-
judication of "minor" disputes of a grievance character. Yet there has
never been any serious suggestion that the same should be carried over to
industries subject to the National Labor Relations Act.
The spectre of price regulation haunts some of those who' fear that any
plan of governmental adjudication adopted under the Railway Labor Act
87. See Roberts, supra note 74, at 109.
88. Id.
89. J. Kaufman, Logic and Meaning of Work Rules on the Railroads, Proceedings of the
Fourteenth Annual Meeting, Industrial Research Association, 378-88 (1961).
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would spread to other industries and bring governmental price-setting
with it. What is overlooked, however, is that railroad and airline rates
are, and for years have been, regulated by the federal government acting
in the public interest.90 Thus, should not the government be obligated to
act in the public interest to regulate railroad and airline rates of pay,
rules and working conditions when the processes of collective bargaining
fail to do so?
A realistic appraisal of the entire situation has led representative
groups, speaking for a cross-section of our economy, to carve out an
exception for the railroads and airlines and to express support for at least
the principle of H.R. 8320. The Chamber of Commerce of the United
States has adopted this declaration of policy:
Arbitration should, as a general rule, be wholly voluntary and should only be used
as an adjunct to free collective bargaining. Where fact finding boards are prescribed by
law and where recommendations or awards of such boards have in practical effects
become binding on one party to the dispute, the recommendations should be made
legally binding on both parties to the dispute or the use of fact finding boards should
be discontinued.9 '
The Board of Directors of the Transportation Association of America,
representing not only transportation management but also users, adopted
the following resolution on July 26, 1966-in the middle of the airline
strike then in progress: "[T]he Railway Labor Act should be amended
to provide for final and binding adjudication by a Presidential Board, of
disputes involving rates of pay, rules and working conditions, preferably
on a permanent basis.' 92
CONCLUSION
The need for insurance against interruptions of essential rail and air
transportation services by strikes is clear. While there are many forms
it might take, the provisions for governmental adjudication proposed by
H.R. 8320 would serve the interests of all concerned-the public, trans-
portation management and organized labor. While it would give the
public the protection against strikes which is needed, it would enhance
rather than detract from the role of collective bargaining. It would be the
most equitable solution because its obligations would fall equally on labor
and management and would substitute familiar principles of decision by
impartial third parties for trial by economic combat. At the same time, it
90. 54 Stat. 911, 912 (1954) ; 72 Stat. 788 (1958).
91. Chamber of Commerce of the United States: Policy Declaration 1967-68, 63.
92. Transportation Ass'n of America, Report at 3 (August 19, 1966).
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would shield the President from unwarranted economic and political
pressures. Limited to the railroad and airline industries, it would pose
no threat of further governmental intervention in the labor affairs of
others.
